Non-proliferation

The use of nuclear energy poses two questions that are of universal interest:

• How can we prevent nuclear energy from being used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destructions?
• How can we use nuclear energy responsibly and safely for peaceful means?

The American policy pursued after the Second World War was summarised in the speech by President Eisenhower “Atoms for Peace”: the stimulation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of verification and control (safeguards).

In 1956, two organisations were created in this vein, which aimed to encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its control:

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for European Member States.

On 1 July 1968, the non-proliferation treaty was proposed for signature. This treaty only includes the recognition of five nuclear-weapon states (United States, Soviet Union, China, United Kingdom and France) and it prohibits the development and the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states. Each non-nuclear-weapon state must submit all nuclear materials in its territory to the controls required by IAEA, by signing up to a cooperation agreement with IAEA. This additional control (currently voluntary) expands verification to all nuclear activities of a non-nuclear-weapon state.

Safeguards

This area covers all of the control measures defined internationally that are available to IAEA for controlling the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a country. This can involve: regular inspections of nuclear facilities, the assessment of nuclear accounting, the verification of nuclear material quantities in a certain country, the collection of information or the use of external sources, such as images transmitted by satellite or by information from third-party countries. Nuclear control should not be confused with nuclear security (measures that a nuclear operator must take to protect employees, the population and the environment against radioactivity) or with nuclear protection (measures that a nuclear operator or a transporter must take to protect against nuclear terrorism).

Non-proliferation treaty

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty (non-proliferation treaty) entered into force on 5 March 1970. The majority of countries signed the treaty. Only three countries with large quantities of nuclear materials are not members, namely India, Pakistan and Israel.

The non-proliferation treaty contains numerous rights and obligations for the parties:

1. Non-nuclear-weapon states undertake to not develop or produce nuclear weapons.
2. Nuclear-weapon states undertake to not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states and to not cooperate with non-nuclear-weapon states in the production or development of nuclear weapons.
3. Non-nuclear-weapon states undertake to authorise IAEA guarantees in their territories by an agreement with IAEA (Article III, paragraph 1). This is currently a general guarantee agreement under which all of the nuclear materials of the non-nuclear-weapon state in question in the territory are subject to IAEA control. Apart from a general guarantee agreement, several parties signed an additional protocol with IAEA under which all of the nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon state in question are subject to a control relating to the nuclear fuel cycle. A specific regulation applies for Member States of the European Union. This additional control (currently voluntary) expands verification to all nuclear activities of a non-nuclear-weapon state. A voluntary regulation applies to France and the United Kingdom out of the nuclear-weapon states by agreement with Euratom.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states undertake to collaborate in the field of nuclear energy through the transfer of nuclear materials and nuclear equipments, as well as through the exchange of technologies and scientific data. The transfer of nuclear materials and nuclear equipment can only be carried out if the peaceful use of nuclear energy is guaranteed by the application of the safeguards required (by IAEA). These obligations in relation to controlling nuclear exports have been perfected and completed through forums, such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (article IV and article III, paragraph 2).
5. Nuclear-weapon states undertake to strive towards complete disarmament of nuclear weapons and to take measures that aim to stop the course of nuclear armament (article VI).
6. All of the parties have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (article IV paragraph 1).

Nuclear verification and safeguards in Belgium

To allow the International Nuclear Energy Agency to draw conclusions relating to the absence of nuclear material thefts and the absence of clandestine nuclear activities in Belgium, Belgium has concluded agreements with IAEA and Euratom together with other non-nuclear-weapon states, in accordance with article III, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the treaty of 1 July 1968 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (non-proliferation agreement). The strict application of these agreements guarantees that the nuclear energy is only used for peaceful means in Belgium and not for the development or production of nuclear weapons.

The European Regulation and the Law of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions specific to the International Atomic Energy Agency for carrying out inspection and verification activities in Belgium, in accordance with the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 taken into account in sections 1 and 4 of article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, lay down the national application of general safeguards in Belgium. Facilities that hold any quantity of nuclear materials must also perform nuclear accounting. Nuclear inspectors of the Federal Nuclear Control Agency (AFCN) support the verification and inspection work of Euratom and IAEA.

The European Regulation and the Law of 1 June 2005 on the application of the Additional Protocol of 22 September 1998 to the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 taken into account in article III, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, lay down additional obligations in Belgium.

The Directorate-General Energy monitors nuclear activities in Belgium and therefore it is responsible for obtaining information related to the following nuclear activities at IAEA:

• state and civil nuclear research and development;
• the production of certain nuclear equipment, which will be used in the civil nuclear combustion cycle;
• nuclear exports and intracommunity transfers to a Member State of the EU;
• nuclear imports;
• activities relating to the nuclear fuel cycle over the next ten years;
• nuclear research and development within the private sector relating to the enrichment of radioactive waste or to the reprocessing of nuclear fissile materials.

Except for nuclear exports and intracommunity transfers, the Directorate-General Energy spontaneously contacts natural and moral entities.

For nuclear exports and intracommunity transfers, it is sufficient to send a detailed export file to the Directorate-General Energy, prior to the actual export, containing the following data: a description of the goods, the quantity, the place of storage of the goods, the final point of use and the (presumed) export date. The full information (including the exact date of export) must be sent to the Directorate-General Energy within thirty days following the quarter during which export actually took place. This obligation is inextricably linked to the obligations regarding nuclear exports.

Protection against nuclear terrorism

The non-proliferation treaty aims to prevent nuclear energy from being abused by governments for the manufacture of nuclear weapons (risk of proliferation). A bundle of commitments and obligations for governments ensures that the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be guaranteed by a state.

Furthermore, nuclear materials must be protected against unlawful removal or theft by private persons or organisations (nuclear terrorism). The regulations concerning the security of nuclear facilities and the security of nuclear transport fall under the remit of AFCN.